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There is little doubt that sexism and ageism still exist. To remedy
these "isms," there are laws to protect both women and older workers
from discrimination in the workplace, namely Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),' which prohibits sex discrimination as
well as discrimination based on many other protected categories, 2 and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 3 which pro-
hibits age discrimination.4 Despite these protections, an older woman
cannot bring a claim based on the fact that she feels she was discrimi-
nated against because she is an older woman. In other words, her claim
must be brought either on the basis of her sex or on the basis of her age,
but not on the basis of both her sex and age combined.5 This Article pro-
poses to remedy what this Author believes is a serious shortcoming in
our employment discrimination laws.
In 1980, courts first recognized that Title VII should protect black
women as a separate protected category, distinct from protections af-
forded sex or race alone.6 In other words, the courts realized that black
women were discriminated against differently from other women, and
differently from black men. Accordingly, in cases where a race discrimi-
nation claim or gender discrimination claim would fail (because statistics
revealed that race or gender alone was not an indicia of discrimination),
courts were willing to consider black women as a protected subclass.7
This is often referred to as "sex plus race" discrimination, and courts
t Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Effective July 2004.
B.A., 1992 Michigan State University; J.D. 1998, magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, University of
Michigan Law School.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
2. Id. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discriminatory employment practices based on "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin").
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
4. Id. §§ 623(a)-(c).
5. This is not to suggest, however, that her complaint cannot allege both sex discrimination
and age discrimination, only that each claim will be analyzed separately.
6. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-33 (5th Cir.
1980) (explaining that the purposes of the statute would not be served if a black woman was dis-
criminated against but could not gain relief because she could not establish a claim based on sex or
race alone).
7. See id.
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have allowed plaintiffs to plead a prima facie case of discrimination
based not on their race or sex 8 alone, but on their sex plus their race.9
This Article proposes that sex plus age should be treated as a sepa-
rate protected subclass much in the same way as sex plus race is consid-
ered. This proposal is based on this Article's thesis that older women are
treated differently (and much more negatively) than older men and
younger women, both in employment situations and by society as a
whole.
Part I of this Article will discuss general employment discrimination
theories and principles, and then will outline the emergence of the sex-
plus theory of discrimination. Part I will also discuss the dearth of case
law dealing with the sex plus age theory of discrimination. 0 Part II will
look at the experiences of older women from a social and economic per-
spective, and propose that those experiences are truly unique from the
experiences of older men or younger women. Finally, Part III will con-
clude that because older women are discriminated against in a manner
different from their older male or younger female counterparts, they
should be protected as a separate category, just as black women are pro-
tected. Once courts recognize this theory of discrimination, perhaps the
more subtle discrimination suffered by older women (not only in em-
ployment, but by society as a whole) will be brought to the forefront and
addressed. "1
I. STATE OF THE CASE LAW
A. Introduction to Employment Discrimination Principles
For a reader unversed in discrimination law theory and principles,
some background is necessary. It has already been stated that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimination, as well as dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin or ethnic-
ity. 2 Specifically, Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice
for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization to refuse to
hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate, limit, segregate, or classify
employees on the basis of their race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.' 3 While the legislative history regarding sex as a protected category
under Title VII is scant, it does reveal that "sex" was added to Title VII
8. Gender and sex are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
9. Courts have also considered sex plus other characteristics. See infra Part I.B.
10. This shortage may be in part blamed on the fact that two different statutes cover sex and
age discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting sex discrimination); 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)-(c)
(prohibiting age discrimination).
1I. Of course, this Article does not address, much less propose to remedy, the societal dis-
crimination against older women. It only seeks to remedy a deficiency in the employment discrimi-
nation laws.
12. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to 2000e-2(c).
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as an attempt to defeat the passage of the entire Act. 14 Those who sug-
gested the addition of sex to the Act were sure that even the proponents
of the racial protections of the Act would cave when faced with the
proposition of women becoming a protected class.' 5
Nevertheless, scholars have given Title VII a very broad reading:
In brief, Title VII demands a broad definition of discrimination-
broad enough to protect every individual from the deprivation of any
form of employment opportunity by any means, device, practice, or
policy. Furthermore, if even one individual suffers, the statute is vio-
lated-regardless of whether that individual's race, gender, or ethnic
group is represented in the applicable workforce; regardless of
whether the plan or policy is voluntary or mandatory; and regardless
of whether any nondiscriminatory options are available. 16
Consistent with this broad reading, the Supreme Court, through several
cases, has established two primary methods to evaluate all discrimination




In order to establish a disparate treatment case of discrimination (by
far, the most popular theory used), 18 the plaintiff must prove that the em-
ployer's action was taken with intent to discriminate.' 9 Sometimes, this
intent can be gleaned from what is referred to as "direct evidence" of
discrimination. One example of direct evidence would be credible proof
that the employer stated, "We are firing Amy Smith because she is a
woman." Of course, proof of this type is rarely available, and certainly
never so bluntly stated. More often, direct evidence might manifest itself
in "written or spoken words demonstrating bias against a protected
group, such as 'women should not work outside of the home,' 'blacks
14. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971) (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964)
(statement of Rep. Green explaining that the inclusion of "sex" to Title VII would "clutter up the bill
and ... be used to help destroy.., the bill")).
15. See id.
16. Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Un-
der Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 769, 794 (1987).
17. See e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (applying disparate
treatment analysis to hold that a woman denied a partnership position in an accounting firm because
she did not match a sex stereotype had an actionable claim under Title VII); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977) (applying disparate impact analysis to find that Alabama's statutory
height and weight requirements for prison guards disparately affected women in violation of Title
VII). Generally, the principles and theories used for analyzing sex discrimination claims are also
used to analyze claims brought pursuant to the ADEA. See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 154 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 1998).
18. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
19. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n. 15.
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can't do this job,' or 'I would never hire a foreigner. ' ' 20 In order to
establish discriminatory intent, "[t]he plaintiffs evidence must be able to
connect the expressed bias to the challenged employer action ....
Only after the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discriminatory intent
will a prima facie case of discrimination be established. 22 If direct evi-
dence can be proven, the employer is subject to liability for the discrimi-
nation.
Sometimes, cases involve not only proof of some direct evidence of
an illegal or discriminatory motive, but also some evidence of a legiti-
mate motive for the employment decision.24 These cases are referred to
as "mixed motive" cases. 25 In these cases, once the illegal motive is con-
nected to the employer action, the burden of production shifts to the em-
ployer, whereby the employer must prove that it would have made the
same decision even absent any illegal motive.26
Employers are fairly savvy these days. Often, there is no direct evi-
dence that the employer had a discriminatory motive. Because it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to read the minds of the employer's decision mak-
ers, the Supreme Court articulated a three-step analytical framework for
establishing indirect evidence of a discriminatory motive.27
In cases where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
showing: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) that she applied and
was qualified for a job which the employer had available; (3) that she
was rejected; and (4) that following the rejection, the employer continued
to seek applicants or eventually filled the position with someone outside
the plaintiffs protected classification.28
Once the plaintiff has met this burden of establishing a prima facie
case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer to estab-
lish a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. 9 At this point,
20. Sabina F. Crocette, Considering Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination Claims by Women:
Examining Approaches to Pleading and Analysis-A Pragmatic Model, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 115, 127 (1998).
21. Id.
22. See id.; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 11I, 121 (1985) (citing Team-
sters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44).
23. See Crocette, supra note 20 at 127.
24. Id. at 128.
25. Id.
26. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 252; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2005(g)(2)(b)(i) & (ii) (1994).
27. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973).
28. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Of course, this prima facie case framework is
modified in cases of termination or other types of adverse employment action. See, e.g., Ercegovich,
154 F.3d at 350 (demonstrating the prima facie framework for a termination action). For instance, in
a termination case, the second prong of the framework would simply be that the plaintiff was quali-
fied for the position, the third prong would be modified to read that "she was terminated," and the
fourth prong would be modified to state that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside her
protected classification. Id.
29. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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the inference of discrimination established by a plaintiffs prima facie
case is destroyed. 30 The plaintiff still has one final opportunity to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's explanation for
its action is not the true reason, and that it is more likely than not that
discrimination was the real reason for the challenged action. 31 The plain-
tiffs burden of persuasion may be met by establishing that the defen-
dant's reason is not worthy of credence, that it was insufficient to cause
the adverse action, or that it is more likely than not that discrimination
was the real reason.32
2. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact cases do not involve a claim of intentional dis-
crimination. Instead, the plaintiff in such cases will allege that an em-
ployment practice or requirement, while neutral on its face, dispropor-
tionately affects one protected group over another.33 The Supreme Court
first recognized this theory of discrimination in Connecticut v. Teal,34
where the Court held that requiring applicants to take a written examina-
tion in order to be eligible for consideration as a supervisor operated to
exclude a disproportionate number of black employees over white em-
ployees, and therefore, had a disparate impact on the black plaintiffs.35
Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discrimination under the
disparate impact theory, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
the challenged practice or policy is related to job performance. 36 In order
to do this, an employer has to use "professionally accepted methods" to
demonstrate that its hiring or employment practices are predictive or
significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior that
are relevant to the job.
There are three different techniques for an employer to demonstrate
a significant correlation. 38 First, the employer can use "content valida-
tion," which demonstrates that a hiring test, for instance, actually meas-
ures performance of tasks that are relevant to the job.39 The second, and
30. See id. at 802-03.
31. Id. at 804.
32. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting
McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 513 (7th Cir. 1993)).
33. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
34. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
35. Teal, 457 U.S. at 455-56.
36. Thompson v. Miss. State Pers. Bd., 674 F. Supp. 198, 209 (N.D. Miss. 1987); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("Congress has placed on the employer the
burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment
in question.").
37. Joanne Bal, Proving Appearance-Related Sex Discrimination in Television News: A
Disparate Impact Theory, 1993 U. CH. LEGAL F. 211, 224 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405,431 n.29 (1975)).
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 945, 1016 (1982)).
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most used technique, is "criterion-related validation," which "analyzes
'the relationship between performance on a test or other 'predictor' and
performance on the relevant job,' to ensure that the predictor actually
predicts job performance." 4° Finally, "construct validation" focuses on
measuring "mental capacities presumed important for job performance,
to ensure that these 'constructs' actually bear on job performance. '" '
The case of Christine Craft is an example of how this theory might
work in a sex discrimination case. Ms. Craft was an anchorwoman who
was demoted to a reporter because she did not meet the appearance stan-
dards that her television station employer set for her.42 She filed suit
against her employer, based on a disparate treatment theory, alleging that
the appearance-related requirements set by her employer were more
strictly enforced on women than men.43 The court held, however, that
there was no evidence that the standards were more harsh for women
than men because both parties were subject to some input on their cloth-
ing, hair, and make-up. 44 Accordingly, her claim failed.45
One legal theorist opined that if Craft had brought her case under a
disparate impact theory, rather than the disparate treatment theory, she
may have been successful in her claim. 46 In the theorist's opinion, the
focus groups used by the television station, which operated to cause Ms.
Craft's demotion, had a disproportionately disparate effect on women
over men because they took into account society's biases and prejudices
about the way women are supposed to look.4 7 It is unclear, of course,
whether such a theory would have succeeded, but it does serve to illus-
trate the difference between the two theories.
B. Emergence of the Sex-Plus Discrimination Theory
Having discussed the various frameworks under which discrimina-
tion cases are brought, the reader is better prepared to discuss the sex-
plus theory. The sex-plus discrimination theory is based on a disparate
treatment model rather than a disparate impact model. In a sex plus dis-
crimination case, the "plaintiff does not allege that an employer dis-
criminated against a protected class as a whole [(e.g., women)], but
rather that the employer disparately treated a subclass within the pro-
tected class.' 48 This theory was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.49 In that case, the defendant
40. Id. (quoting Bartholet, supra note 39, at 1018).
41. Id. (citing Bartholet, supra note 39, at 1019).
42. Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir. 1985).
43. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1210.
44. Id. at 1215.
45. Id.
46. Bal, supra note 37 at 226, 231-32.
47. Id.
48. Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
49. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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had a policy of refusing to hire women with pre-school age children.5°
The defendant was honest about the fact that it did not place a similar
limitation on men with pre-school age children, but a "straight-up" sex
discrimination claim failed in the court below because the vast majority
of applicants hired for the position were women, albeit women without
pre-school age children.5'
The Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment to the
defendant and held that even though not all women were affected, Title
VII did not permit one hiring policy for men and another for women.52
Accordingly, courts have interpreted this case as establishing a rule
whereby if a plaintiff can prove that she would have been offered the
position if she were a man, she can establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination even if other women were offered the same position.53 In
order to determine whether there was disparate treatment, "the plaintiffs
class is defined as a subclass of women, for example, women with pre-
school children., 54 This theory has been coined the "sex-plus" theory of
discrimination.55
This theory was used again in a case where the defendant, an air-
line, required that all of its female flight attendants be unmarried, but did
not require the same of male flight attendants.56 The Seventh Circuit,
50. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543.
51. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 441 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
53. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
54. Id. This reasoning makes sense when one considers the legislative history behind Title
VII. The courts have made clear that it is irrelevant whether other employees in the protected class
were unharmed. It matters only whether the plaintiff was harmed because of a protected characteris-
tic. See Bayer, supra note 16, at 794.
55. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 542. When discussing this proposed Article with a colleague,
who was unfamiliar with the sex-plus theory of discrimination, he argued that the courts should have
never expanded the law to allow sex-plus cases. Using the Phillips case as an example, he argued
that instead of using the sex-plus theory, the court should have simply looked at whether men were
treated differently than women, regardless of whether one looks at some women or all of the women.
His argument, at first blush, made sense, until I belatedly remembered the framework for establish-
ing a prima face case using indirect evidence of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802-07. As stated above, supra Part I.A. 1, courts must first look at whether a plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-07. In a hiring case, for example, in order
to establish a prima facie case, the court would look at whether: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a pro-
tected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for, and applied for, the position; (3) the plaintiff was
rejected for the position; and (4) the position was either held open or given to someone outside the
protected classification. Id. at 802. Using this framework in the Phillips case, it becomes clear why
the Court needed to adopt the sex-plus theory. Turning to the fourth prong of the prima facie test,
whether the position was given to someone outside the protected classification, in Phillips, the
positions were given to women, albeit women who did not have pre-school children. See Phillips,
400 U.S. at 543-44. Therefore, the plaintiffs case would have failed, just as it did in the court below.
See Phillips, 441 F.2d at 4. Accordingly, the argument that the sex-plus theory was an unnecessary
judicial expansion of the law fails when one considers the framework under which discrimination
cases are decided. This Article does not attempt to defend or even analyze in great detail the merits
of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
56. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1971).
2003]
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following the precedent set down by Phillips, held that the airline's em-
ployment policy violated Title VII. 57 The court stated:
[Title VII] is not confined to explicit discriminations based "solely"
on sex. In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes. [Title VII] subjects to scrutiny and eliminates such irra-
tional impediments to job opportunities and enjoyment which have
plagued women in the past. The effect of the statute is not to be di-
luted because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of the
protected class.
58
In keeping with the sex-plus terminology, this case can be referred to as
"sex plus marital status" discrimination.59
Finally, in 1980, the Fifth Circuit decided the first sex plus race dis-
crimination case.60 In this case, the plaintiff argued that the defendant
discriminated against her on the basis of both her race and sex because
she was a black woman. 61 The district court separated her one claim into
two separate claims---one for race discrimination, and one for sex dis-
crimination-and, therefore, dismissed her complaint.62 The Plaintiff
could not prove that either her sex alone or her race alone was used in
hiring decisions.63 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the court had
failed to address the plaintiffs claim based on both race and sex com-
bined, reasoning that:
In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it did not intend
to provide protection against discrimination directed especially to-
ward black women as a class separate and distinct from the class of
women and the class of blacks, we cannot condone a result which
leaves black women without a viable Title VII remedy. If both black
men and white women are considered to be within the same protected
class as black females for purposes of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case and for purposes of proof of pretext after an employer has
made the required showing of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action, no remedy will exist for dis-
crimination which is directed only toward black females.
64
57. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198.
58. Id. (footnote omitted).
59. See id. at 1199.
60. Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
61. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1029.
62. Jeffries v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 425 F. Supp. 1208, 1213-15 (S.D. Tex.
1977). Please note that the district court spelled the plaintiff's name differently than the Fifth Circuit:
"Jeffries" as opposed to "Jefferies." This Article will use each spelling depending upon which court
is being cited.
63. Jeffries, 425 F. Supp. at 1215.
64. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032-33.
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Thus, the court held that discrimination against black females can exist
even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women,
and that for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, black men and
white women must be treated as persons outside the plaintiffs protected
class.65 Other cases have similarly upheld the sex plus race theory of
discrimination. 66 The rule of law that can be gleaned from the sex-plus
line of cases is that plaintiffs can bring a Title VII discrimination claim
based on a sex-plus theory "if they can demonstrate that the defendant
discriminated against a subclass of women ...based on either (1) an
immutable characteristic [(e.g., race)] or (2) the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right [(e.g., the right to marry or have children)]. 67
C. The Sex Plus Age Theory in the Court[s]
68
Despite the many cases discussing the sex-plus theory, few courts
have addressed the sex plus age theory of discrimination. One of the first
courts to address this issue in any detail was the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania in Arnett v. Aspin.69 In that case, the court, after analyzing other
sex-plus cases, held that the above-stated rule-that a sex discrimination
claim should survive if the defendant discriminated against a subclass of
women based on either an immutable characteristic or the exercise of a
fundamental right-should also apply in the sex plus age analysis be-
cause age is an immutable characteristic.
70
In Arnett, the plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated against as
an older woman since she was passed up for a transfer to a position that
was given to younger women or men over the age of forty. 71 The defen-
dants sought summary judgment, arguing that because Title VII does not
allow sex plus age discrimination claims, plaintiffs claim should be
viewed as two separate counts-one for sex discrimination and one for
age discrimination. 72 According to the defendants, those claims fail be-
cause (1) the persons chosen for the position were women (hence, the sex
discrimination claim must fail) and (2) the plaintiff only brought the
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (10th Cir. 1987) (allowing,
on remand, the consideration of racial and sexual harassment evidence "to determine whether there
was a pervasive discriminatory atmosphere" in violation of Title VII).
67. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1239. The court in Arnett announced the above rule when it was
discussing sex plus age discrimination. See id. at 1240-41. This will be discussed more fully below.
See infra Part I.C.
68. As will be seen below, only one court, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, has actually discussed and decided the issue of whether the law should recognize a
sex plus age theory of discrimination. Other courts have given it only cursory treatment. See infra
notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
69. 846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
70. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1241.
71. Id. at 1236.
72. Id. at 1237-38.
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claim under Title VII, which does not prohibit age discrimination. 73 The
plaintiff, in turn, argued that she is a member of a protected subclass
under Title VII: older women. In doing so, the plaintiff relied on a sex
plus age theory.74
The Amett court first discussed the emergence of the sex-plus the-
ory and then discussed the rule mentioned above-that a plaintiff can
bring a sex discrimination claim under Title VII if she can demonstrate
that the defendant discriminated against a subclass of women based on
either (1) an immutable characteristic or (2) the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right. 75 The plaintiff claimed that because age is an immutable charac-
teristic, she has a viable sex plus age discrimination claim under Title
VII.7 6 In response, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs case was
different "because it combines a classification afforded protection by
Title VII with a classification afforded protection by the ADEA, a com-
pletely separate statute., 77 The defendants noted that other sex-plus cases
combine sex with an unprotected classification, such as marital status, or
with a classification also protected by Title VII, such as race. 8
The court found the distinction irrelevant, and looked towards the
reasoning of the sex-plus line of cases to justify the result.79 The court
noted that the sex-plus line of cases did not create a new remedy, but
rather, closed a loophole that allowed employers to discriminate against
80
some women as long as they did not discriminate against all women.
As the court aptly stated, "Such a result cannot be condoned." 8' Accord-
ingly, the court found that "the current line drawn between viable and
nonviable sex-plus cases"-that is, whether the discrimination was
against a subclass of women "based on either an immutable characteristic
or the exercise of a fundamental right"-was adequate, and denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment.82
Very few other courts have addressed the issue of whether a plain-
tiff can allege a sex plus age theory of discrimination. Of the courts that
have had the opportunity to address the issue, they have either declined
the invitation to decide the issue, or have recognized the cause of action
73. Id. at 1237. Age discrimination is prohibited by the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)-(c). It is
unclear whether the plaintiff could have alleged an age discrimination claim pursuant to the ADEA.
See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1235-36. The defendants admitted that all of the persons selected for the
positions were women under forty or men over forty. Id. at 1236. Because there were men over forty
chosen for the positions, any age discrimination claim the plaintiff might have alleged would likely
fail. See id. at 1236-37.
74. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238.
75. Id. at 1239.






82. Id. at 1241.
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with little or no discussion.83 As an example of the latter, the Eastern
District of Missouri simply followed the precedent of Arnett, without any
further discussion, and held that the "[p]laintiff can proceed under Title
VII on a theory of sex-plus-age discrimination. 84 In another case,
O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc.,85 the plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendants favored young, attractive, inexperienced males over their older
female counterparts.86 The court never decided whether the plaintiffs
sex plus age claim was viable as a matter of law. In fact, it presumably
assumed it was and turned immediately to the factual merits, finding that
the plaintiff had established enough proof to withstand the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.87
Finally, the Sixth Circuit in Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,88 re-
fused to accept the plaintiffs invitation to recognize a sex plus age the-
ory of discrimination.89 In keeping with the court's philosophy of judicial
restraint, the court stated:
[T]he Plaintiff appealed, asking us to recognize a new cause of action
for sex plus age discrimination, or discrimination against "older
women." We decline the invitation to decide the issue, partly because
it is unnecessary for us to do so. Assuming [plaintiff] made out a
primafacie case for such a claim, she nevertheless was not able to es-
tablish that the defendant's reason for discharging her (a reduction in
work force) was pretextual.
90
The court later stated that not only was it unnecessary to decide whether
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case (because the plaintiff
could not prove pretext), but also noted that no federal court of appeals
had ever recognized such a cause of action.9'
I was clerking for the Judge who wrote this opinion, the Honorable
James L. Ryan, when this case was decided. While I completely respect
and agree with Judge Ryan's judicial restraint philosophy, it is unclear
83. See, e.g., Hall v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 995 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Mo.
1998).
84. Hall, 995 F. Supp. at 1005.
85. 121 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 1997).
86. O'Regan, 121 F.3d at 1065.
87. See id. Although this case describes the type of discrimination from which the plaintiff
suffered as discrimination against "older women," in all fairness, it appears that the plaintiff could
have alleged both sex and age discrimination claims separately. Id. The court was not at all clear
whether it was considering plaintiff's sex and age claims together or separately. See id. The district
court, on remand, sheds some light on the issue by revealing that the plaintiff did allege claims under
both Title VII and the ADEA. O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., No. 95 C 6464, 1999 WL
731775, at *1 (N.D. I11. Aug. 30, 1999). Nevertheless, even this court lumped the counts together
when analyzing the plaintiffs case. See O'Regan, 1999 WL 731775, at *3.
88. No. 98-4035, 1999 WL 701911, at * 1 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999).
89. Sherman, 1999 WL 701911, at *1.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *5. It is one of the author's goals (as presumptuous and ambitious as it may be) to
change this fact.
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whether this court would have recognized the sex plus age theory even if
it had been required to decide the issue. I suggested in my bench memo-
randum to the judge that, in my opinion, older women are discriminated
against differently than older men and younger women in much the same
way as black women are treated differently than black men and white
women. It is this opinion that will be justified in the next Part of this Ar-
ticle.
II. OLDER WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES-AGEISM AND SEXISM MERGE
This Part will provide justification for the author's assertion that
older women are treated differently than older men by society as a
whole, which often leads to discrimination in employment. Part III will
then argue that the discrimination laws should recognize older women as
a protected subclass, using the sex plus age theory of discrimination.
It is doubtful that anyone would argue that we have completely
eradicated sexism and ageism in our society. But the question is: is the
combination of these two types of discrimination worse than each type of
discrimination on its own? Otherwise put: is the sum greater than its
parts? In order to answer that question, we must first look at the views
and stereotypes that define each type of discrimination, and then deter-
mine whether the discrimination against older women is different than
that against older men or younger women.
A. Ageism Defined
"Ageism ... is a constriction that rearranges power relationships,
just like any other kind of discrimination or prejudice. When one ages,
one may gain or lose. With ageism, one is shaped into something that is
always less than what one really is."992 Ageism has also been defined as a
"socially constructed way of thinking about older persons based on nega-
tive stereotypes about aging as well as a tendency to structure society as
though everyone is young., 93 Whereas age discrimination refers to ac-
tions taken by employers that disparately affect older persons, ageism
refers primarily to attitudinal barriers. 94 "Preconceived notions, myths
and stereotypes about the aging process and older persons persist and
give rise to discriminatory treatment."95 Simply put, ageism is a belief,
largely unsupported by fact, that older people are "something" that they
are not. How we define that "something" is not all that important. The
"something" could be "frail," "sick," "unproductive," "resistant to
92. FRIDA KERNER FURMAN, FACING THE MIRROR: OLDER WOMEN AND BEAUTY SHOP
CULTURE 117 (Routledge 1997).
93. ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, POLICY ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OLDER
PERSONS BECAUSE OF AGE 4 (2002), available at http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/publications/age-
policy.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) [hereinafter ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION].
94. Id. at 4-5.
95. Id. at 2.
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change," "slow," or "unable to learn new things." Regardless of what
label one uses to describe older people, that label will most likely be in-
accurate. Using labels about older persons based on beliefs not grounded
in fact is ageism. 96 Ageism attitudes often lead to age discrimination,
which are actions that treat older persons unequally due to their age.97
With respect to our workplace, assumptions and stereotypes are all
too prevalent. "Older workers are often unfairly perceived as less pro-
ductive, less committed to their jobs, not dynamic or innovative, unre-
ceptive to change, unable to be trained or costly to the organization due
to health problems and higher salaries. 98 In fact, however, there is sub-
stantial evidence that older workers:
" are highly-productive, offering considerable on-the-job experi-
ence;
" do as well or better than younger workers on creativity, flexibility,
information processing, accident rates, absenteeism and turnover;
* can learn as well as younger workers with appropriate training
methods and environments; and
" do not fear change but rather fear discrimination.
99
When discussing the lack of proof to support employers' beliefs re-
garding older workers' skills and attributes, one author concluded, after
looking at many studies of older employees at work (which included
more than 60,000 subjects), that there is "an exceedingly weak relation-
ship between age and performance."' 00 For instance, the studies revealed
that older workers are absent less often and have a lower frequency of
accidents in the workplace than their younger counterparts.' 0 1 Further-
more, the studies revealed that age-related declines in intellectual ability
are minimal and are more often related to disease than age. 102 Finally, the
studies found little proof that older workers cannot learn new tasks.
10 3
Because "[a]ging is a highly individual experience ... it is not possible
to generalize about the skills and abilities of a person based on his...
age... ."104
96. See id. at 10 ("In the past, many standards, factors, requirements and qualifications that
discriminate on the basis of age have been justified on the basis of presumed characteristics associ-
ated with aging.").
97. See id. at 4-5.
98. Id. at I0-1I1.
99. ld. at 11 (footnotes omitted).
100. Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It's Been,
Where It Is Today, Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 679 (1997).
101. Id. at 680-81.
102. Id. at 682 (quoting Dorothy Fleisher & Barbara H. Kaplan, Characteristics of Older
Workers: Implications for Restructuring Work, in WORK AND RETIREMENT: POLICY ISSUES 140,
151, 152 (Pauline K. Ragan ed., 1980) (citations omitted)).
103. See id. at 683 (quoting Fleisher & Kaplan, supra note 102, at 152-55).
104. ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 93, at 11.
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However, because employers are unlikely to know of the above ref-
erenced studies, it is likely that they will continue to make negative as-
sumptions.10 5 Accordingly, despite the reality that older people can be
and are very good employees, age discrimination will likely remain very
prevalent.'°6
B. Sexism Defined
Turning our attention from ageism to sexism, despite the difficulty
in defining it, most people know it when they see it. Just as ageism re-
flects negative and mostly inaccurate perceptions and stereotypes about
older people, sexism reflects negative, demeaning, and inaccurate stereo-
types about women. Some of these stereotypes include: (1) that a
woman's place is in the home; 07 (2) that a woman's worth is based in
part on her appearance and sexuality;'0 8 and (3) that a woman's worth is
based on her reproductive ability.'09
The most common theory employed by courts in combating sexism
has been called gender differentiation. 0° The theory is based on the as-
sumption "that there are real differences between the sexes, usually bio-
logical or natural," and that only those differences can be the basis of a
gender-based decision."' The renowned feminist theorist, Catharine A.
MacKinnon, in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, ex-
plains this theory of feminism:
Upon these differences [between the sexes], society has created some
distorted, inaccurate, irrational, and arbitrary distinctions: sex stereo-
105. Eglit, supra note 100, at 683.
106. Id. at 668. Eglit's article explored the ADEA in some depth, including an in-depth analy-
sis of all cases filed under the ADEA in 1996. Id. at 590-663. As one of his conclusions, the author
speculated about the future of age discrimination and lawsuits brought on that basis. Id. at 664-706.
He stated that the most likely scenario is that the same misperceptions and negative attitudes that
exist today will persist. Id. at 668. He concluded this discussion with the following somewhat pessi-
mistic, albeit probably true, prediction:
That speculation ... leads to the unfortunate conclusion that the perceived age bias that
(I) prompted enactment in 1967 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and that
(2) has allegedly motivated employer decisions and actions which in turn have prompted
the filing with the EEOC of thousands of charges of discrimination over the years, and
that (3) has generated hundreds of cases over the years . . . in which ADEA plaintiffs
have prevailed, is likely to persist into the foreseeable future.
Id.
107. See UN Says: Gender Discrimination Must End, INVESTING FOR WOMEN, at http://
womeninvest.about.com/library/weekly/aa92I00a.htm (last visited January 19, 2003) [hereinafter
UN Says] (stating that ideas about "'real men' and 'a woman's place' are instilled at an early age and
are difficult to change. These restrictions take a heavy toll").
108. See NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST
WOMEN 3-8 (Perennial 2002).
109. REVISIONING AGING: EMPOWERMENT OF OLDER WOMEN 18 (Jenny Onyx, et al., eds.,
Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1999) [hereinafter REVISIONING AGING] (noting that in a society that
emphasizes sexuality and reproductive powers, an older man, unlike an older woman, is still consid-
ered a sexually potent person).
110. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
117 (Harvard University Press 1987).
IlL. Id.
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types or sex roles. To eliminate sex inequality, in this view, is to
eliminate these wrong and irrational distinctions. The evil and dy-
namic of sexism here is the twisting of biological males and females
into masculine and feminine sex roles. These roles are thought to
shape men in one way and women in another way, but each sex
equally. Implicit here is the view that initiatives toward sex equality
are limited to or constrained by real underlying differences.
"Arbitrariness" of treatment in social life is measured by implicit
reference to these differences. This is liberal feminism's diagnosis of
the condition of women. The solution that responds to this diagnosis
is that we need to ignore or eliminate these distortions so that people
can realize their potential as individuals .... The way you know the
wrong of stereotyping is distortion is that there is something
preexisting to distort. Liberal feminist strategies for change
correspond to its critique: ignore or eliminate irrational
differences. 1
1 2
The desire and attempt to eliminate irrational and stereotypical assump-
tions about women is the basic goal behind most of our discrimination
laws." 3 It is evidenced most prominently in the bona fide occupational
qualification ("BFOQ") defense to a discrimination claim.' 1
4
The BFOQ is a statutory defense to a prima facie claim of disparate
treatment." 5 It allows an employer to intentionally choose employees
based on the employees' sex if the sex or the sexual traits are reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business."16 The
BFOQ defense assumes that there are real biological differences between
the sexes and that occasionally those differences will result in only one
sex being qualified for a particular job. The most obvious example of a
legitimate use of the BFOQ defense is for the position of a wet nurse,
where only women would be qualified to perform such a position." 8 An
employer cannot prohibit women from working a particular job if such a
prohibition is based simply on sexual stereotypes, rather than biological
fact. 119
Laws prohibiting discrimination based on sex have as their goal rid-
ding sexism from the workplace, but the research makes clear that we
still have much to accomplish to truly combat sexism, and an even
112. Id. at 117-18.
113. See, e.g., Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 500 F.2d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[1]f the
employer in any way permits stereotypical culturally-based concepts of the abilities of people to
perform certain tasks because of their sex to creep into its thinking, then Title VII will come to the
employee's aid.").
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e)(I) (1982).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. A wet nurse is a woman "that cares for and suckles young not her own." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2598 (Merriam-Webster Inc. 1986).
118. Another classic example of a legitimate BFOQ is gender restrictions on applications for
casting acting roles in the entertainment industry. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
LAW 118 (West Publishing Co. 1994).
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2000).
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greater hurdle to leap in ridding the gender hierarchy that is still so
prevalent in our society today. 20 For instance, consider this statistic:
Women encompass one-half of the population, and when housework is
accounted for, women "perform nearly two-thirds of all working hours,
receive only one-tenth of world income and own less than one percent of
world property."' 2' It is difficult to argue that sexism does not exist when
faced with these statistics.
C. Ageism and Sexism-The Effect on Older Women
This subpart will demonstrate how the biases, prejudices, and
stereotypes associated with ageism and sexism become more unbearable
when combined. In other words, it will reveal how the sum really is
greater than its parts.
1. Appearance Matters
Despite our laws prohibiting age discrimination and sex discrimina-
tion, one only has to look as far as the television in one's home to see an
example of how the merging point of sexism and ageism has really af-
fected older women in a very unique, and unfortunately, very negative
way. In 1970, the Federal Communications Commission (F.C.C.) estab-
lished regulations prohibiting discrimination against women in the em-
ployment practices of broadcast licensees. 22 Despite these regulations,
anchorwomen over age forty remained the subject of discrimination. 
23
Statistics revealed that in 1985, forty-eight percent of the men and only
three percent of the women who were local news anchors were over
forty. 124
The reason for such disparate statistics is apparently based on the
appearance of older women. Women over age forty are regarded as "'too
old' and 'too unattractive' to anchor the news."'125 While for "male an-
chors, 'gray hair and ... wrinkles are considered marks of distinction,..
. for women they're the kiss of death."" 126 Based on these stereotypes,
and the discriminatory treatment resulting from the stereotypes, one au-
thor argued that older anchorwomen should be able to pursue a cause of
action based on sex plus "age related appearance" as the basis for the
120. See, e.g., UN Says, supra note 107 (noting that discrepancies in pay are significant, and
even more entrenched in developed countries).
121. See WOLF, supra note 108, at 23 (quoting the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs (cita-
tions unavailable)).
122. In the Matter of Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondis-
crimination in Their Employment Practices, 23 F.C.C.2d 430 (1970) (codified at 47 C.F.R. §
73.2080 (1982)).
123. Patti Buchman, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchorwomen on
the Basis ofAge-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 190 (1985).
124. Id. (citing Sally Bedell Smith, Television Newswoman's Suit Stirs a Debate on Values in
Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1983, at44, col.1).
125. Id. at 191.
126. Id. (citations omitted).
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discriminatory treatment.127 Using the rule that sex plus an immutable
characteristic should result in a legally permissible basis for a prima facie
case of sex discrimination,128 the argument is made that age-related ap-pearance is as immutable as simply age.129
A similar argument was made in another Note, which emphasized
that the discrimination against older women in news casting is often re-
lated to the preferences of the viewing public, which demonstrates that
society as a whole treats older women negatively.130 In arguing for a sex
plus age (or age related appearance) theory by the courts, Gielow states:
Comments by various news industry personnel indicate that sex-plus
discrimination against female anchors does, in fact, occur frequently.
According to one news consultant, "Women in this business face
pressures that men do not, but those pressures often stem from the
public." Others admit, "Appearance is a heck of a lot more of a factor
in hiring a woman than a man," and "[i]t is a fact of life that men
have an easier time of it in this business in terms of aging than
women do." Finally, a female newscaster complains, "If I'm as ag-
gressive as I think I should be in a particular situation, a lot of people
get annoyed or write in and ask me, 'Don't I know how ladies be-
have?"' These comments suggest that women news personnel are
subject to different criteria than are their male counterparts. Specifi-
cally, women not meeting certain age, appearance, and demeanor re-
quirements may lose their jobs (or not get hired at all), while men
with the same characteristics do not suffer any adverse conse-
131quences.
These Notes suggest that, especially when in occupations where appear-
ance is believed to be important, the treatment of older women is much
worse than that of older men or younger women. 
32
Even outside the TV news business, older women are treated differ-
ently than older men, presumably because of their age-related appear-
ance. For instance, one survey found appearance to be the single most
important factor in employee selection for a wide variety of jobs.' 33 The
127. Id. at 196-98.
128. See supra Part I.C.
129. Buchman, supra note 123, at 197.
130. See Leslie S. Gielow, Sex Discrimination in Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REv. 443, 444
(1985) (stating that television broadcasters believe that "the public prefers women with certain
traits-for example, youth, beauty, and nonaggressive behavior-but that the public does not de-
mand these qualities of male newscasters, or at least not to the same degree as of women" (citations
omitted)).
131. Id. at 453-54 (citations omitted); see also Bal, supra note 37, at 211 (arguing that a double
standard exists in television news because anchorwomen are forced to conform to a "narrower and
more demanding ideal of youth and beauty" than are men).
132. See also Bal, supra note 37, at 214 (noting that appearance related standards are far more
prevalent for anchorwomen than men, and noting that male anchors are generally twenty years older
than females).
133. See Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to Prohibit Appearance
Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 195 (2000) (citing Facial Discrimination:
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"study found that attractive attorneys earned more than their less attrac-
tive classmates after five years of practice," and the "gap increased after
fifteen years of practice," which suggests that there is a correlation be-
tween age and attractiveness, and that correlation will affect women
more negatively than men.
134
Other literature also looks to age-related appearance as a significant
reason why older women are devalued more than older men. For exam-
ple, in Facing the Mirror." Older Women and Beauty Shop Culture, au-
thor Frida Kerner Furman discusses her ethnographic study of older
women in the setting of a beauty salon.135 She undertook this study to
open up a discussion of older women's experiences and how they differ
from the experiences of younger women, noting that stereotypes and
experiences of older women are often absent in feminist scholarship. 1
36
Furman suggests that women's self image is based on perceptions
and standards set by men and youthful women and notes that "physical
appearance is a chief measure of women's worth throughout the life cy-
cle."' 37 She summarizes her study by stating:
In this book we have seen that in our socio-cultural order, older
women must cope, not only with ageism, but with its conjunction
with sexism, as well. We have witnessed repeatedly in these pages
that the systemic devaluation of old age and of women's intrinsic
worth have serious consequences for the well-being of older
138women.
Furman notes that while many of the subjects of her study personal-
ize their negative experiences, it is very likely that those experiences are
brought on by an ageist society---one that worships youth and beauty.1
39
Of course, as noted above, if age was the main impetus in the negative
treatment of older women, then older men would suffer similarly. 40 One
only has to look as far as our politicians and the CEOs of the world to
note that age has not truly affected the power or status of older men.
Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100
HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (1987)).
134. Id. (arguing that appearance attributes are associated with sex and age based on the fact
that the largest number of appearance related claims appear to involve sex or gender in some respect,
and stating "further, for women in particular, age and beauty often may be intertwined in an appear-
ance-related discrimination claim"); see also ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 93,
at 2 (noting that often age works in "combination with other grounds of discrimination to produce
unique forms of disadvantage;" specifically, women experiencing aging differently than men face
compounded disadvantage). The ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 93, at 5, gives
the example of a fifty-five year-old woman who is refused a waitress job because she does not fit the
image of the restaurant, which hires older men for maitre d's and younger women as waitresses.
135. See generally FURMAN, supra note 92.
136. See id. at 2-3.
137. Id. at 117.
138. Id. at 1.
139. See id. at 117.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
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Interestingly, when we discuss the treatment by society of older
women, we are not just discussing treatment by men. Many believe that
younger women are also guilty of a form of discrimination against their
older sisters. One author stated that there is a competition between older
women and younger women.141 Some believe this competition is because
of the inherent conflict between mothers and daughters.' 42 Naomi Wolf,
in The Beauty Myth, states that women are taught to dismiss their moth-
ers' teachings about beauty since they believe that their mothers have
failed through their own aging.1
4 3
Other evidence of discrimination against older women by younger
women is evidenced in women's magazines, which are run predomi-
nantly by women. 44 These magazines perpetuate the stereotype that
"young equals beautiful" because advertisers, who are trying to sell
women their beauty-enhancing products, dictate the content of the maga-
zines. 145 Even women's magazines ignore older women. 146 One of the
ways they do this is by airbrushing age off the faces of the older women
portrayed in the magazines, even when the content of the article or the
advertisement calls for an older woman. 147 Wolf believes this practice
takes away one of the fundamental freedoms-"the freedom to imagine
one's own future and to be proud of one's own life.'
148
2. Financial Woes of Older Women
It is not just beauty, or the perceived lack of beauty, that causes
older women to be in a more precarious situation than older men. The
marginalization of older women also appears to be based on, or is the
consequence of, their lack of status within the community, which is
based in large part on factors over which older women have no control.
One factor that leads to their inferior status is their poverty. This is
caused in large part because women live longer than men. Women in the
sixty-five and over age group are the fastest-growing segment of the
population. 49 Furthermore, because women live longer than men, one-
half of all women who live to be over sixty-five can expect to be wid-
141. See WOLF, supra note 108, at 14.
142. See, e.g., id. at 74; see also Judy Klemesrud, 'If Your Face Isn't Young': Women Confront
Problems of Aging, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1980, at A24 (describing a counselor's story of how "she
had encountered much discrimination against older women by younger women, 'because of the
mother bond,' referring to common mother-daughter conflicts").
143. WOLF, supra note 108, at 74.
144. See id. at 81.
145. See id. 81-82.
146. Id. at 82.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 83 ("Airbrushing age off women's faces has the same political echo that would
resound if all positive images of blacks were routinely lightened. That would be making the same
value judgment about blackness that this tampering makes about the value of female life: that less is
more.").
149. Klemesrud, supra note 142, at A24.
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ows.150 As aptly stated: "America continues to look the other way rather
than look at the true face of poverty . . . . It belongs to an older
woman."
151
There are several frightening statistics about older women's finan-
cial status, as compared to that of men or of younger women. For exam-
ple, women over forty-five "earn an average of less than 60 percent of
salaries paid to men the same age."'' 52 Women's median earnings peak at
age forty-four, rather than fifty-five for men. 53 "Men ages 45 to 54 earn
8 percent more than younger men; however, women ages 45 to 54 earn 2
percent less than women ten years their junior."'' 5 4 "Older women are
clustered in low-paying, traditional 'women's' jobs, such as sales and
clerical positions," and even in those positions, men earn thirty-three
percent more than their female co-workers. 55 Perhaps one of the most
surprising statistics is that "[c]ollege educated women ages 45 to 64
earned 8 percent less than male high school graduates of the same
age."'156 Simply put, "[d]espite their burgeoning ranks in the workforce,
[older women] grow poorer-and glamorless-as they grow older."'
' 57
Women's lack of financial status is also affected by their lack of
opportunities when they were young. "[A] history of little education,
alcoholic or violent husbands, and heavy childcare responsibilities has
left [women] with few opportunities for obtaining self-sufficiency before
old age."'' 58 Another author stated: "Although women seeking work face
the double hurdle of sex discrimination and age bias, the real problem-
the major barrier to finding work-is the lack of marketable skills."' 59
Also presenting a disadvantage to older women is the fact that employ-
ers, when making hiring decisions, often consider gaps in employment
history as a negative mark against the candidate. 16° "This can be a par-
ticular problem for older women who have re-entered the workforce after
childbearing ....,,6
150. Id.
151. Darlene G. Stevens & Barbara Sullivan, Age Old Problem: Job Gains Made by Young





156. Id. Perhaps this statistic is not so surprising if many of the women in this study had taken
considerable time off work to raise children. However, the fact that this role (raising children) is
consistently left to women perpetuates the inferior status of older women in the workforce.
157. Id.
158. REVISIONING AGING, supra note 109, at 89.
159. ROBERT S. MENCHIN, NEW WORK OPPORTUNITIES FOR OLDER AMERICANS 240 (Prentice
Hall 1993).
160. ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, supra note 93, at 14.
161. Id.
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3. Gender vs. Age
One question that comes to mind when discussing the disparate
treatment suffered by older women is whether the biases and discrimina-
tion endured by them can be blamed more on their sex, their age, or both
equally. Some believe it is the sex that matters. One author makes clear
that while "the marginalization of older women can be attributed to both
sexism and ageism, the primary factor in their inferior status is that of
gender .... ,, The reasoning for this theory is based largely on the fa-
vorable treatment received by older men over older women:
[A]n older man is regarded more favorably by our culture, reflecting
the privileging of the male throughout the lifespan. He is usually
healthier though shorter lived, more mobile, financially more secure,
and more likely to have a partner. In a society that emphasizes sexu-
ality and reproductive powers, he is, unlike the older woman, consid-
ered a sexually potent being. He is also considered to have carried
out a socially useful role in that he has "worked," whereas the
women whose lives have centered around childbearing and house-
keeping are considered never to have "worked" or to have been
"kept." Women who have been in the workforce have had their con-
tribution to the finances considered adjunctive to their family duties.
Again the old adage, "a woman's place is in the home," has contrib-
uted to the belief that for a woman there is no problem with the tran-
sition to the retirement years. Until recently, most research on the
aged was centered on men's adjustment to retirement and loss of
work role. 163
These authors also noted that the second wave of feminism, with the
maturing of the feminists of the seventies, finds older women at the fore-
front of the challenge of dealing with the combination of age and sex
bias.' 64 These feminists are beginning to direct their attention "to the fact
that the discrimination and devaluation of older women is the culmina-
tion of a lifetime of attempted subordination of women." 165
Another theory for the conclusion that gender is more of a factor in
discrimination against older women than age is the fact that age dis-
crimination is not always seen as having the same type of animus that
other types of discrimination, namely race or sex discrimination, have.'
66
While it may be "true that hiring officials are not immune to the bright-
ness, vigor, and attraction of youth, nor always above exploiting these
attributes for commercial advantage, . . . [these] choices involve prefer-
162. REVISIONING AGING, supra note 109, at 18.
163. Id. (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 18-19.
165. Id.
166. See Eglit, supra note 100, at 676 (stating that deep-seated animus has been rejected as the
reason for age bias).
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ences for one group, rather than antagonism against another.' 67 This
theory supports the conclusion that it is more the sex than the age that
matters.
However, if one takes into consideration the fact that older women
are often subjected to discrimination from other, younger women, one
would arguably be left with the conclusion that it must be age that mat-
ters because younger women would not (presumably) discriminate
against their own gender. Younger women are probably aware (at least at
a subconscious level) that their own aging will likely lead them to be in
the same position that they view (often with disdain) other older women
they know and meet. But, just as in many other areas of our society,
68
younger women like to believe that they will never become the "older
woman" because they will be more successful at combating age than the
older women they know. Of course, this theory recognizes that these
women do not actually think they can find some eternal fountain of
youth. They know they will age, but they believe they can combat the
physical signs of aging, which in their mind, will lead to an avoidance of
the negative stereotypes associated with being an older woman. Perhaps,
then this theory leads us full circle back to the argument that appearance
and the "beauty myth" really are a major cause of discrimination against
older women. Thus, because appearance-related discrimination is more
often directed at women, 169 one would assume that the sex matters more
than the age. Certainly, attempting to figure out whether it is the sex or
the age that leads to the significantly greater marginalization of older
women is an interesting debate. However, it is unnecessary for us to un-
dergo these mental gymnastics. What matters is the cumulative effect of
the marginalization of older women.
4. Cumulative Effect of Sex and Age Discrimination
This subpart has focused on the reasons why older women are mar-
ginalized in our society-namely, because "appearance matters" and
because generational differences have caused older women to be finan-
cially inferior to older men. It is important, however, to emphasize just
how serious this marginalization is in society.
As stated by one author: "a steadily increasing body of discourse
has considered and found support for the proposition that older women
face employment and societal discrimination that is separate and distinct
167. Id. at 677 (quoting SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER-AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 5-6 (1965)).
168. One example of society's ignorance of its own fate is a constant belief that the random
violence or disease that we all see and hear will never happen to us.
169. See generally Adamitis, supra note 133, at 206 (stating that "consideration of appearance.
may impact women disproportionately").
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from that of older men and younger women."'' 70 Certainly, women in any
occupation where appearance matters find significant discrimination in
the workplace. As stated earlier, in 1985, forty-eight percent of men
and only three percent of women who were local news anchors were over
the age of forty.
172
But even in areas where appearance should not be considered a pri-
mary job function, older women still do not fare well. This is evidenced
primarily by the difference in incomes between older women and older
men. 173 Recall from above the troubling statistic that women over forty-
five earn an average of less than sixty percent of salaries paid to men the
same age. 174 Older women also earn less than younger women. 175 In our
society where income and net worth determine one's status, these statis-
tics speak loud and clear.
Finally, we only have to look as far as the images conjured up in our
heads when picturing our grandparents to realize just how much we all
marginalize older women. While most of us love our grandmothers and
have very fond memories of her, how many of us can say that the image
conjured up in our heads was one of a powerful, independent, intelligent,
and capable woman? Compare that image to one of our grandfathers, or
other older men we know, who are much more likely to be running our
businesses and our government, and it is easy to see how society
marginalizes older women.
Having established the reasons for, and the magnitude of, the mar-
ginalization of older women, the question remains: What do we do about
it? Is the sex plus age theory the best way to combat this type of dis-
crimination?
III. RECOGNIZING THE SEX PLUS AGE THEORY
Having established a difference in treatment by society and by em-
ployers of older women as compared to older men and younger
women, 176 this Part will argue that the sex plus age theory is not only
necessary (as it is the only way to protect this subclass of women), but is
also justified by current legal precedent.
When advocating for either a new law or an expansion of current
case law, several questions must be answered. First and foremost, one
must look at whether there is a compelling need for recognized judicial
expansion of the law. Above, we saw that discrimination against older
170. Crocette, supra note 20, at 116.
171. See Buchman, supra note 123, at 190.
172. Id.
173. See Stevens & Sullivan, supra note 151, at 12.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See supra Part II.C.
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women is fundamentally different and worse than that against older men
or younger women. 7 7 But does that necessarily lead us to the conclusion
that we need to recognize the sex plus age theory? Is there not adequate
protection under our current laws, namely Title VII against sex discrimi-
nation, 178 and the ADEA against age discrimination? 7 9 This Part will
seek to answer these questions, concluding that our current discrimina-
tion theories are inadequate to protect older women and courts need to
recognize the sex plus age theory.
An equally important question is whether such an expansion of the
existing law is legally justifiable. This Part will also address this issue,
concluding that legal precedent not only supports the finding of a sex
plus age theory, but also demands it.
A. The Necessity of the Sex Plus Age Theory
Having concluded in Part II that the discrimination against older
women really is different and distinct from that against older men or
younger women, the question remains: so what? The reader might won-
der why the sex plus age theory is necessary to protect older women.
After all, it is true that under current law an older woman could sue un-
der Title VII and the ADEA to cover both her sex and age discrimination
claims. 80 Accordingly, we should first look to whether a lawsuit brought
under both of those statutes would be successful without the use of the
sex plus age theory.
Some evidence indicates that older women might be quite success-
ful in their lawsuits brought under the ADEA. For instance, in Eglit's
article, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It's
Been, Where It Is Today, Where It's Going,181 Eglit found that more
women were successful in their age discrimination lawsuits than men.1
82
In fact, as one of the conclusions for his study, Eglit stated that there was
a "feminization . . . of the ADEA," and that that the number of female
plaintiffs had increased dramatically. 83 This study would seem to indi-
cate that older women have plenty of success bringing age discrimination
lawsuits and that there is no need for the sex plus age theory.' 84 How-
177. Id.
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to 2000e-2(c).
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)-(c).
180. See supra Introduction and Part I.A; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) to 2000e-2(c); 29 U.S.C. §§
623(a)-(c).
181. See Eglit, supra note 100.
182. Id. at 659-60 (quoting Michael Schuster, Joan A. Kaspin, & Christopher S. Miller, The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: An Evaluation of Federal and State Enforcement, Employer
Compliance, and Employee Characteristics, A Final Report to the NRTA-AARP Andrus Foundation
47-48 (unpublished June 30, 1987)). Eglit's study looked at every published ADEA decision in all
federal and state courts during 1996. Id. at 590-91.
183. Id. at 663.
184. See generally id. at 590-91, 599-612, 657-63 (recognizing female plaintiffs had greater
success in ADEA suits than male plaintiffs).
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ever, it is not clear that this one study is indicative of older women's
success in age discrimination lawsuits.
First of all, even though female plaintiffs won in more age discrimi-
nation lawsuits than did men, the win rate is still not very impressive.
Older women bringing age discrimination lawsuits in 1996 won only
twenty-three percent of the total cases filed.1 85 Some might argue that a
win rate of twenty-three percent is a successful statistic. This might be
true when compared to some areas of employment law, where plaintiffs
win much less frequently, such as in cases brought under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). 186 However, when one considers that sev-
enty-seven percent of female plaintiffs over age forty are not successful
with their claims, one must question why. 187 While employers have an
array of legitimate business defenses to discrimination claims, one is still
left wondering how it is possible that seventy-seven percent of all female
plaintiffs over age forty 88 were either less qualified than another em-
ployee, or (even less likely) engaged in some type of misconduct suffi-
cient to warrant their discharge. Furthermore, and more importantly, an
older woman's lawsuit brought pursuant to the ADEA will only be suc-
cessful if the individual that replaced her (assuming a termination case)
was younger.' 89 Obviously, her suit under the ADEA would fail if an
older man replaced the older woman. 190
Similarly, a woman claiming sex discrimination pursuant to Title
VII will only prevail if she is replaced by a man. '91 These types of cases
are fairly straightforward and would likely not require a sex plus age
analysis, because either a straightforward sex discrimination claim or age
discrimination claim would allow the older woman to prevail (assuming
185. Id. at 660.
186. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); Ruth
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 99, 100 (1999) (stating that defendants prevail in more than 93% of cases brought against
them). There are more significant hurdles to bringing an ADA claim than an age discrimination
claim. Under the ADA, a plaintiff has to prove that she is a qualified individual with a disability, see
42 U.S.C. § 12112, which is much more difficult than meeting a prima facie age discrimination
claim where the plaintiff only has to be over forty years old. 42 U.S.C. § 631(a). In both claims, of
course, there are other requirements, such as proving that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employ-
ment action and was treated differently than an employee not in the protected category. See supra
Part I.A.
187. See Eglit, supra note 100, at 660.
188. Id.
189. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 18, at 176.
190. I realize that the term "older" is a relative term. The ADEA protects individuals who are
forty years of age or older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). However, if a woman who was sixty years old was
fired and replaced by a man who was forty years old, she would still meet her prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADEA because, although he is also in the protected class (those over forty),
he is substantially younger than the female employee. See, e.g., Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse
Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 321 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that a plaintiff who is
replaced by someone "substantially younger" is a reliable indicator of age discrimination but ulti-
mately holding that a six year age difference was not "substantially younger").
191. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 109.
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she could prove that it was her sex or her age that motivated the adverse
employment action.)1
92
The fact that there are laws to prevent both age and sex discrimina-
tion claims is probably the most likely argument against the expansion of
the law to allow sex plus age claims. While there is no current literature
or case law specifically arguing that the sex plus age theory is unwar-
ranted (unless it was unnecessary to decide a particular case), one would
assume that one of the primary counter-arguments against the theory is
that the sex and age discrimination laws (Title VII and the ADEA, re-
spectively) adequately protect older women who feel they have been
discriminated against. As stated earlier, these laws might be adequate in
some circumstances, such as if an older woman was replaced by a
younger man.193 In that scenario, her complaint could allege both age
discrimination and sex discrimination separately and (assuming the em-
ployer did not have a legitimate reason for her termination or she was
able to prove pretext), both claims would succeed. However, a simple
factual scenario such as this is only one possible type of circumstance
under which an older woman might experience discrimination.
Analyzing a much more troubling scenario of the all-too-common
reduction in force, where an older woman falls victim to corporate down-
sizing, reveals a very different result. Let us assume that an older woman
was the only employee let go in her sales department, and the department
is now left with ten employees. Assume further, for simplicity's sake,
that of the ten employees left in the department after the reduction in
force, five of them are younger women (under age forty) and five of
them are older men (over age forty). We will also assume (in an attempt
to draft the perfect scenario to illustrate the point) that our older woman
finds proof that managers made comments while discussing the termina-
tions, such as: "The best sales people are either established, powerful
men who can persuade and pressure the sale, or the pretty young things
who can mesmerize the customer long enough to trick him into the
sale."'194 Before the fresh-out-of-law-school plaintiffs attorney runs into
court with this factual scenario, a few words of caution-"not so fast!"
Despite the fact that it seems as though the perfect case of discrimi-
nation against an older woman has been created, this case will neverthe-
192. It is not enough for a plaintiff to prove that she was terminated, or passed up for a promo-
tion, or not hired, and that someone in her protected classification was treated better than she was.
See supra Part I.A. Assuming the employer can articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its adverse employment decision, the burden will still be on the plaintiff (in our case, the older
woman) to prove that it was her sex or her age that motivated the employer. Id.
193. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
194. A much easier example would be if the manager had simply stated: "Let's get rid of the
old bag-she's a woman not capable of the high-pressure sales tactics and she's way too old-so
much past her prime." I did not choose such a stark comment because it could be seen as direct
evidence of discrimination, and no prima facie case analysis would be necessary. See supra notes
18-23 and accompanying text.
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less not make it past a motion for summary judgment. 95 Under our cur-
rent law, with rare exception,196 a court would consider this case under
two separate theories: (1) an age discrimination theory and (2) a sex dis-
crimination theory. Let us take each one in turn.
In order to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination in a
reduction in force case, 197 the plaintiff must establish that: (1) she was at
least forty years of age at the time of her dismissal; (2) she was qualified
for the position; (3) she was discharged; and (4) additional direct, cir-
cumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer
singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons., 98 This
fourth element is met when the employee can demonstrate that compara-
ble employees not in the protected group were treated more favorably.' 99
To prove this fourth prong, the older woman in our scenario would
have to show evidence that younger employees were favored over older
employees. 200 However, in our scenario, half of the employees left in the
department after the reduction in force are over age forty. Accordingly,
the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.
Likewise, the older woman's sex discrimination claim would fail
because the same number of women were retained (and therefore, re-
ceived favorable treatment) as were men. 20 1 Accordingly, as the reader
can see, even with the very strong evidence that the older woman was
being discriminated against because she is an older woman, the plain-
tiff's Title VII and ADEA claims would both fail if analyzed sepa-
202rately.
Contrast that result with the result that would arise if the older
woman in our scenario could use a sex plus age theory of discrimination.
In this instance, the group of comparables for establishing a prima facie
case would be both the older men and the younger women.20 3 Because
the plaintiff in our hypothetical was the only older woman terminated out
195. Unless, of course, the court in which it is brought is the United States District for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which has already recognized a sex plus age theory, see Arnett v.
Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (E.D. Pa. 1994); supra Part I.C., or the court in which this case is
brought is foresighted enough to recognize that this is the perfect test case for a sex plus age theory.
Thus, despite my conclusion that this hypothetical case would not make it past a motion for sum-
mary judgment, if any plaintiff's attorney gets a case with facts this good, the attorney, in my opin-
ion, should definitely run with it.
196. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1241; supra Part I.C.
197. The framework is different in a reduction in force case because no one replaces the em-
ployee who was terminated as part of the downsizing. For example, compare the framework in notes
27-30 and their accompanying text with Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344,
350 (6th Cir. 1998).
198. Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 350.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
203. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240 n.7.
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of the department, she has proof that both younger women and older men
were treated more favorably. Accordingly, she could definitely establish
a prima facie case, and even if the employer alleged that it had a good
reason for terminating her (e.g., lack of performance, etc.), she would
have fairly strong evidence-management's offensive and discriminatory
comments-that the employer's reason was pretextual.2 °4
Hence, the reader can see how it is possible to go from not being
able to survive summary judgment, if the sex and age discrimination
claims are brought separately, to not only establishing a prima facie case,
but very possibly winning a jury trial if the case is brought under a sex
plus age theory. (5
Having said that, is it enough to show that one factual scenario
would come out differently if the sex plus age theory is used? Perhaps
the more important question is: how common is this type of discrimina-
tion?
Some commentators believe that this type of discrimination is not
only common but bound to get worse. For example, in one study by the
Women's Legal Defense Fund, involving 335 cases alleging both sex
and age discrimination, only ten of those cases involved a combination of
the two theories. °6 Furthermore, as mentioned above, no federal appel-
late court has extended protection under Title VII to older women under
the sex plus age theory, evidencing a failure in the law to adequately
protect this subclass of women.20 7 Crocette argues for hybrid sex plus age
claims because, as she states: "[U]nless the current analytical structures
under Title VII and the ADEA evolve to more adequately consider the
hybrid nature of cases brought by many older women, the lack of ade-
quate redress will become worse., 20 8 She also notes what was noted
above in our hypothetical scenario-that considering sex and age claims
separately allows employers to defeat older women's claims by showing
204. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
205. Of course, there are no guarantees that this hypothetical plaintiff would win her sex plus
age discrimination lawsuit. Suffice it to say, however, that having spent the vast majority of my legal
career representing employers in legal discrimination lawsuits, this would definitely be considered a
"bad" case from the employer's perspective-one which would likely lead to an early and substan-
tial settlement.
206. See Crocette, supra note 20, at 115-16. Of course, this argument could also cut the other
way. Arguably, the fact that so few women have brought this type of claim indicates that there are
few women who feel as if they have been discriminated against as older women. However, it is just
as likely a theory that women who could possibly have a "sex plus age" claim (but who do not have
a good case if the sex and age claims are brought separately) are told by their attorneys that there is
no such cause of action.
207. Id. at 140; see also supra Part I.C. Similarly, although courts have addressed the issue of
age-plus discrimination, those courts rejected the proposition that age-plus claims are valid under the
ADEA. Crocette, supra note 20, at 149; see also Luce v. Dalton, 166 F.R.D. 457, 461 (S.D. Cal.
1996) (rejecting an age-plus theory).
208. See Crocette, supra note 20, at I 18.
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older men and younger women who are treated favorably, even though
unfavorable treatment of older women exists simultaneously.2°
9
Another argument demonstrating the need for the sex plus age the-
ory is the plethora of literature describing appearance-related discrimina-
tion. While it is certainly true that an employer could discriminate
against the appearance of men and younger women, the literature above
supports the fact that it is far more common for older women to be the
victims of appearance-related discrimination than for older men or
younger women to fall victim to this phenomenon.2'
For example, one author argues that "for women in particular, age
and beauty often may be intertwined in an appearance-related discrimi-
nation claim. '' 21 2 The same author also points out that given the common
correlation of beauty to youth, appearance- related claims also dispropor-
tionately affect older women.21 3 This literature suggests that if the
"beauty myth" and appearance-related discrimination exist, then it only
follows that older women will suffer the majority of the harm.
B. Legal Justification for the Sex Plus Age Theory
Even if the reader accepts the theory that discrimination against
older women is prevalent and unremedied by the current legal principles,
it is nevertheless necessary to offer legal justification for the proposition,
rather than simply revealing that this is a social wrong that should be
remedied.
In order to provide this legal justification, we shall first look at what
the current law states. As stated earlier, only one case thoroughly dis-
cussed the sex plus age theory and conclusively recognized the theory as
a legitimate method of establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
214
tion. This court found that there is no rational reason to not apply the
sex plus age to the sex-plus line of cases.2t 5 The court followed the rule
that the sex-plus theory is available when the plaintiff is able to prove
she was discriminated against because of her sex plus an immutable
characteristic. 216 The court was simply following the rule established in
the sex plus race line of cases.2 17 However, this holding was found by
only one federal district court, and it cannot, therefore, be conclusively
209. Id. at 118-19.
210. See, e.g., Adamitis, supra note 133 (arguing that states should include protection for
appearance-related discrimination in their employment discrimination laws); see also supra Part
II.C. 1. (discussing the role appearance plays in society and the working world).
211. See supra Part II.C.l.
212. Adamitis, supra note 133, at 207.
213. Id. at 209.
214. See A rnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1241; see also supra Part I.C.
215. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1241.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 1238-41.
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relied upon as precedent. Therefore, it is necessary for us to undergo the
same analysis the Arnett court did.
The court in Arnett, and all the sex-plus cases before it, turned to the
first Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject, which was Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp.218 As discussed earlier, in Phillips, the Court
stated that an employer cannot have one standard for females and a dif-
ferent standard for males.219 Accordingly, if a plaintiff can prove that she
would have been offered the position (or not fired, promoted, etc.) if she
were a man, she can establish a prima face case of discrimination even if
220other women were treated better than she was. Using this rule in the
sex plus age theory, an older women should be able to prove that, had
she been an older man, she would have been treated differently, even if
there were plenty of younger women who were treated better than she
was. Simply following precedent leads us to the conclusion that the sex
plus age theory should be recognized.
Turning to the sex plus race line of cases, in Jefferies v. Harris
County Community Action Ass'n,22 1 the court found that Congress, when
it refused to modify the word sex with "solely" in the statute, did not
intend to leave black women without a remedy.222 Accordingly, the court
found that, without a finding of a sex plus race discrimination theory,
black women would be left without a remedy.223 The court concluded by
announcing the rule that a sex-plus theory should be used when the dis-
crimination is against a subclass of women based on either (1) an immu-
table characteristic (e.g., race) or (2) the exercise of a fundamental right
(e.g., the right to marry or have children).224
It is not only this rule but also the reasoning behind the rule that
leads to the conclusion (just as it led the court in Arnett v. Aspin) that sex
plus age should be a recognized theory of establishing a prima facie case
of discrimination. One of the arguments that has been made against ex-
tending the sex-plus theory to protect the subclass of older women is that
older women are not discriminated against as a subclass as are black
women.225 Of course, after examining the plethora of literature on the
subject, it is plain to see that this is not simply an accurate statement or a
convincing argument against recognizing a sex plus age theory.
218. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
219. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
220. See id.; see also Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
221. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
222. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032.
223. Id. at 1032-33.
224. Id. at 1033. The court felt these limitations were necessary to avoid claims such as "sex
plus hair length." Id.
225. To the contrary, one older woman states that, because she often experiences marginaliza-
tion by the public, she seeks help from African-American women, whom she believes will empathize
with her feeling of marginality. FURMAN, supra note 92, at 118.
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One other argument that has been made against finding a sex plus
age theory is that age is protected in a separate statute from sex and race
(as well as the other categories protected by Title VII). 226 However, as
the court stated in Arnett, the defendants in that case failed to identify
why that argument reveals a distinction with a difference.227 In fact, as
the court stated in Jefferies:
It is beyond belief that, while an employer may not discriminate
against... subclasses of women, he could be allowed to discriminate
against black females as a class. This would be a particularly illogical
result, since the "plus" factors in the former categories are ostensibly
"neutral" factors, while race itself is prohibited as a criterion for em-
ployment.
228
Under this reasoning, the word "race" can easily be replaced by
"age." Age is a protected classification, regardless of the fact that age is
protected by a different statute than race.229
Other sex-plus cases also support the finding of a sex plus age the-
ory. For instance, in Lam v. University of Hawai'i,230 the Ninth Circuit
recognized a sex plus race claim, not on behalf of an African-American
woman, but on behalf of an Asian woman.23' In so finding, the court rec-
ognized what the Jefferies court implied-that there are peculiar stereo-
types associated with subclasses of women. 232 "Like other subclasses
under Title VII, Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes and as-
sumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by white women., 23 3 These
unique discriminatory biases justify subclass treatment under Title VII to
ensure that an employer is not permitted to avoid liability for discrimina-
226. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240. This reasoning has also been used to find that the law
does not recognize an age-plus claim. See, e.g., Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 457 (refusing to recognize an
age plus disability cause of action). The court stated that:
Congress has not drafted one statute to govern all claims of employment discrimination,
regardless of whether those claims are based upon any of the protected classifications of
race, sex, religion, national origin, age, and disability.... If Congress had intended to al-
low plaintiffs to mix and match theories of liability for employment discrimination, re-
gardless of whether such claim was based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, age, or
disability, it could have amended Title VII to provide protections to older Americans and
Americans with disabilities within the confines of that statute .... Therefore, the argu-
ments of the courts based upon the interpretation of Title VlI's explicit language as bar-
ring discrimination based upon race, sex, national origin, or religion cannot be extended
to support "age-plus" theories of discrimination.
Id. at 46 1.
227. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240.
228. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034.
229. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)-(c).
230. 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
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tion by merely showing that it has not discriminated against all
women.
2 3 4
This line of reasoning is just as appropriate with respect to sex plus
age discrimination. Because there are unique discriminatory biases asso-
235ciated with older women, and because legal precedent calls for a find-
ing of a sex-plus discrimination theory when the "plus" factor is an im-
mutable characteristic (which, of course, age is), 23 6 it only follows that
recognizing the sex plus age theory is legally justifiable.
CONCLUSION
As argued above, the courts' recognition of a sex plus age theory for
discrimination lawsuits brought under Title VII is legally justifiable, war-
ranted, and it is the right thing to do. In Part II, we saw various litera-
ture237 that all supported the fact that there is not only a problem of dis-
crimination against older women, but also that older women are victims
of more severe and more frequent disparate treatment than older men or
238younger women.
This legal and factual truth serves two purposes for this Article's
main proposition. First, it supports the argument that protecting older
women from the unique type of discrimination suffered only by them is
the right thing to do. Second, and perhaps more importantly from a legal
theorist point of view, the fact that older women are discriminated
against as older women (and distinct from the discrimination against
older men and younger women) supports following the reasoning in the
precedent set by the sex plus race cases. Just as black (or Asian) women
suffer from unique forms of discrimination as a subclass, so do older
women.
From the moment I worked on the Sherman case,239 this theory-
that the law should recognize sex plus age discrimination-seemed so
obvious to me that I was shocked to find several years later that very
little had been written about the subject and very few courts had consid-
ered it. The lack of discussion of this area could mean one of two things:
either the problem is not big enough for anyone to worry about, or, the
more likely reason, in my opinion, older women really are a silent minor-
ity.
234. See id.
235. See supra Part I.C.
236. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033.
237. Interestingly, in all my research, I never found a source that disputed the unique discrimi-
nation suffered by older women.
238. See supra Part n.c.
239. See Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 98-4035, 1999 WL 701911, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept.
I, 1999); see also supra pp. 89-90.
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The older women of the past decade were often taught to not seek
careers or challenge male authority. Thus, it is no surprise that if and
when they are discriminated against in favor of older men (who are
thought to age gracefully and gain power and wisdom with age), or in
favor of younger women (who have their beauty and none of the negative
stereotypes associated with older women), they either do not recognize
the discrimination, or do not believe that there is anything they can do
about it.
In fact, as we saw above, without the recognition of the sex plus age
theory, there often is very little that can be done to remedy the discrimi-
24nation against older women. 4° Only when the law and society begin to
recognize this very real, underprivileged subclass of women, will older
women really be given the benefit of equal opportunity in employment.
This, in turn, will hopefully serve to rid the negative stereotypes attrib-
uted to older women.
240. See supra Part III.A.
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